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GREATNESS THRUST UPON THEM*
Class Biases in American Law
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
As FOLLOWERS OF NATURAL LAW and citizens of a nominally egalitarian
society, we tend to resist the concept of a class struggle. I believe that
we resist it at our peril. I propose to argue here that we in fact have a
dominant class in spite of our principles to the contrary, that in
operation if not in intention it is an oppressor class, that we of the
legal and academic professions belong to it by occupation, mindset,
and lifestyle, that its oppressive position is powerfully supported by
many of our legal institutions, and that if we ignore the situation we
cannot avoid responsibility for it
For methodology, I will draw on two authors, the Yugoslav Mi-
lovan Djilas and the Peruvian Gustavo Gutierrez. Djilas may be
regarded as a continuator of Marx and Engels. They established the
idea of a class dialectic in history. They showed how the conditions of
feudal society gave rise to the bourgeoisie, who took power from the
landed aristocracy and established capitalism. They showed how the
conditions of bourgeois capitalism were giving rise to a proletarian
class, destined to take power from the bourgeoisie and abolish capital-
ism. But Marx and Engels believed that when this happened class
dialectic would come to an end. Djilas, in his book The New Class,
showed that the dialectic would go right on. Proletarian power is
necessarily diffused. The proletariat cannot exercise their power on a
day-to-day basis because there are too many of them, and they are not
adequately trained to run an industrial society. They must turn over
their power to surrogates, who have the necessary technical and orga-
nizational skills. These surrogates rapidly develop class interests and
class identities that sharply distinguish them from the proletariat in
whose name they act. Many commentators have remarked on the
takeover of socialist societies by technicians and bureaucrats, but no
one else has done so with the theoretical elegance and the Marxist
methology of Djilas.
Gutierrez is a Catholic priest, and author of the leading book on
liberation theology.2 He certainly owes something to Marxist theory,
* This article is the text of the annual Natural Law Institute Lecture for 1983. It
will appear as part of the concluding chapter in a forthcoming book, Law and
Liberation.
1. M. Djilas, The New Class (New York, Prager: 1957).
2. G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis 1973).
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but his perception of the class struggle seems more empirical, less
theoretical than Marx's. He begins with the obvious fact that there are
unjust institutions by which people are oppressed. Every such institu-
tion creates a distinction between people who are oppressed by it and
have a stake in reforming or dismantling it and people who benefit
from it and have a stake in leaving it intact. A cluster of such institu-
tions affecting the same people creates a class division between people
with a stake in general reform and people with a stake in the status
quo.
Djilas writes about Communist countries and Gutierrez about
Latin America. But their central insights offer complementary metho-
dologies that can be used anywhere. Djilas indicates that we should
examine the forms of diffused power that have grown up around our
modifications of laissez-faire capitalism, and see who the surrogates
are. Gutierrez indicates that we should look at our unjust institutions
and see who has a stake in keeping them going. We will find that both
approaches point to the same class of people.
Let us look first at the forms of diffused power underlying our
political initiatives for the relief of working people. These initiatives
did not bring the proletariat to power in the way Marx and Engels
envisaged, but they did bring about the adoption of many proletarian
agendas. It is significant that the implementation of these agendas has
almost always been entrusted to administrative agencies-that is, to
bureaucratic officials exercising discretionary power. It appears that
the perceived need to regulate the economy in the interest of the
worker requires forms of organization and expertise that cannot be
brought to bear in any other way. The diffused power of the workers,
operating through legislation, has fed into the concentrated power of
the bureaucracy.
The same thing has happened with the direct representation of
workers in the collective bargaining process. It is theoretically possible
for the workers in a small plant to choose one or two of their number
to negotiate with the boss, but making deals with General Motors or
IBM requires organizational skills and knowledge of economics. When
collective bargaining became a condition of doing business instead of a
battle cry, the workers' part in it had to be turned over to people with
the organizational skills and the expertise to carry it out effectively-
that is, to people who were not workers. The diffused power of union
members had to feed into the concentrated power of professional
leaders.
Today, the power of capital has also become diffused. The rela-
tively simple enterprises of the first half of the nineteenth century and
the convoluted trusts of the Gilded Age have turned into the conglom-
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erates and multinationals of today. Graduated income and inheri-
tance taxes have bitten hard into private fortunes. Laser and micro-
chip technology has replaced water power and steam. The task of
launching and operating a major business now requires an assembly of
capital and expertise beyond the reach of even the richest and most
gifted individuals. The typical entrepreneur is no longer a person who
puts up his own capital and runs his own business. He is a person who
sells stock to the public and assembles a management team to run the
business on behalf of the stockholders. The nominal ownership of the
business by the stockholders is recognized chiefly in the lavish graphics
of the reports that management mails out to them. The diffused
power of capital has fed into the concentrated power of management.
This analysis in terms of diffused power, inspired by Djilas, points
to a class of people, leaders in government, labor, and business, who
are characterized by their organizational skills and their technical
expertise, and who have more in common with each other than they
have with the respective constituencies in whose name they exercise
their power. Let us now turn to the more pragmatic approach in-
spired by Gutierrez. That calls for us to look at what is going wrong in
our society, and see who has a stake in its continuing to do so.
Let us begin with poverty and unemployment. We are often told
that these are complex problems, but at one level they are quite
simple. People are poor because we will not spend the money to
relieve them, and they are unemployed because we will not do what is
necessary to put them to work. I say will not rather than cannot
because it is reasonably clear that there would be enough money to
relieve the poor if we did not choose to spend it on other things, and
there would be enough to do to keep everyone busy if we did not
choose to get it done in other ways.
What we choose to spend our money on and what we choose to do
our work with is a highly sophisticated technology, ranging from MX
missiles to electric can openers. We would like to see this technology
providing us with full employment and a well distributed abundance.
But there is no reason to suppose it will, and we intend to go on
investing in it whether it does or not. Pursuing our proposed method-
ology, we must ask who has a stake in maintaining this level of
technology regardless of its effect on the poor and the unemployed.
The answer is not hard to find. It is the class of people who have the
technical and organizational skills to operate the system and draw
material and psychic rewards from doing so.
Examination of other things going wrong in our society leads us to
the same people. Who benefits from increased levels of military
spending? The people who make and operate new weapons systems.
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Who benefits from the erosion of traditional culture patterns and
stable neighborhoods? People who can afford to buy the old furniture,
live in the new or updated buildings, and plug into the instant com-
munities and eclectic lifestyle of the business and professional elite.
Who benefits from the erosion of community values? People who see
the community as a matrix of technical achievement rather than as a
source of social stability and moral support. Who benefits from the
erosion of sexual standards? People who are better able to derive
satisfaction from organizational and technical accomplishments than
from personal relations, middle aged men who can afford to trade
their wives in on expensive new models, and young people who have
never had occasion to learn about deferred gratification.
We are often told that these and the other problems facing our
society are complex, and that it will not do to oversimplify them. This
is true in the same sense that it was true in 1860 that slavery was a
complex problem and William Lloyd Garrison was oversimplifying it,
or true a hundred years later that segregation was a complex problem
and Martin Luther King was oversimplifying it. When we are reflect-
ing on the complexity of our problems, we must not forget that there is
a class of people who benefit from problems being perceived as com-
plex. That is the class of people who have the intellectual and the
organizational equipment to deal with complex problems. These, of
course, are the same people we have seen as benefiting from the things
that are going wrong. In today's American society, to perceive a
problem as complex is to commit its solution to a class of people with a
stake in its not being solved.
To sum up, all our different analyses, theoretical and pragmatic,
point us in the direction of the same class of people, the technical and
organizational elite who are running the country-and running it in
great part in their own interest, as we shall see. Let us take a closer
look at this class.
3
They are defined for the most part by their jobs. They draw their
personal satisfactions and their pay from operating a sophisticated,
capital-intensive technology, from positions in self-contained and
largely unaccountable organizations, from manipulative or patroniz-
ing relations with ordinary people, or from professional expertise.
Those whose jobs place them within the elite are joined by people
who follow their cultural and intellectual lead. The lifestyle and the
3. While these observatins are in great part my own, many' of them were built
on a foundation laid by W. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York, Simon &
Schuster: 1956).
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philosophical categories dictated by the exigencies of technology and
organization are attractive to a good many of our people. Others
accept them through training or habit, or because they are, or seem to
be, the only game in town.
The power of the class members rests on their control of organiza-
tional structures, on their expertise, and on their wealth. In exercising
their power, they are generally not accountable to anyone outside
their class. Organizations are set up so that everyone involved is
accountable to his superior on the organization chart, and to no one
else. Experts are organized in such a way as to be accountable only to
their peers. Our interpretation of personal liberty is such that wealth,
unless it is invested in a regulated business, is generally not account-
able at all.
The wealth of the class is based on salaries and expense accounts-
as the wealth of the landed aristocracy was based on rents and that of
the capitalist class on profits. On the whole, we are persuaded that
legitimate pay differentials correspond either to the number of people
supervised or to the quantum of expertise involved in the job. Mem-
bers of the organizational and technical elite claim and are accorded
higher salaries than other people, and the salaries grow still higher as
they move up in the ranks. What their salaries will not cover their
expense accounts will. I am fairly peripheral in this class, but I have
made three trips to Europe with my whole family at other people's
expense, and eaten innumerable dinners around the country at restau-
rants I could not personally afford.
The lifestyle of the elite differs from that of the rest of our people in
several important ways. First, they are geographically homogeneous
and culturally eclectic. They can move to any part of the country at a
moment's notice and locate themselves through their Century 21 real-
tors in the midst of people who think and live exactly as they do. They
can be comfortable without the family, neighborhood, and subcul-
tural ties on which other Americans depend. Second, they are vigor-
ous consumers. Their houses are full of wall to wall carpeting, sophis-
ticated appliances, and the other things you see advertised on
television. Public transportation is generally not a problem for them.
Neither is health care.
Neither is crime. The places they live and their access to police
protection are such that their persons are secure, and their property is
secure to the extent that it is not insured. Their concern with the
criminal justice system, while often serious, is more academic than
other people's.
At the same time, they are better able than other people to cope
with bureaucracy, public or private. They know how to fill out forms.
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They know when and how to take their business to a higher echelon.
They probably know someone in the organization or know someone
who does. At least, they encounter bureaucractic personnel on a basis
of equality and common perceptions. They do not have the experi-
ence, common with other people, of having their affairs percolate
through a series of inaccessible people and incomprehensible proc-
esses.
On the whole, they like their jobs. On the whole, work is organized
in our society in such a way as to make sure they do. The moves that
we regard as increasing efficiency are almost always ones that make
work simpler and more repetitive in the lower echelons, more creative
and challenging in the higher.
Finally, the elite are ideologically secure. They are concerned about
a wide range of social problems, but they do not generally reflect on
their own responsibility for the existence of those problems. Prevailing
moral doctrine may caution them about how they should use their
privileges, but it continually assures them that the decision is theirs to
make. Our mainstream politics does not challenge their position.
Rather, it insures that the grievances of the wider community against
the whole class will be turned into demands for minor adjustments
between its governmental and corporate wings. But radical politics
does not challenge their position either. It points toward patterns of
organization and technology in which they will play an even greater
part than they do now.
This brings us to the law. It does not appear that Marx and Engels
held, as some of their followers did, that all law is a mere instrument
of the ruling class for serving its interests. They did, however, find a
disconcerting number of instances in which that was in fact the way
the law operated. I find an equally disconcerting number of such
instances today. The ones I am bringing forward here are far from
exhaustive.
In the first place, there are legal dispositions that serve the elite
through mere inadvertence. We maintain in this country the illusion
of a classless society, and the illusion leads us constantly to mistake
class interests for the common good. Problems that are not experi-
enced or concerns that are not felt by the elite are routinely over-
looked in the formulation of public policy by judges, legislators, aca-
demics, and businessmen.
Thus, because the elite are geographically mobile and able to find
similar communities wherever they go, they are very free in adopting
measures that undermine the geographical stability and delicate com-
munities on which others depend for practical and emotional support.
They maintain a system of taxation that does more than any other
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legal measure since the enclosure acts to keep people from holding
onto land that other people want to develop. They fund projects for
turning poor people's housing into rich people's housing, and call the
result urban renewal. They locate public housing and public schools
with no regard either for the disruption of old communities or for the
establishment of new ones. They support corporation and banking
laws that let them move capital where they please, and leave people to
shift for themselves.
In other cases, the relative invulnerability of the elite leads them to
support legal dispositions with a rigorous theoretical consistency that
the rest of the population has to pay for. They send their children to
private schools, and resist on grounds of religious freedom the govern-
ment subsidies that would make such schools accessible to other peo-
ple. Belonging to a class that by and large produces neither victims
nor suspects, they maintain a system of criminal justice that is equally
baneful to both, and insist that the constitution requires them to do so.
For the sake of their freedom to read Lady Chatterley's Lover, they
give legal protection to a pornography industry that corrupts and
exploits people most of whom have never heard of D.H. Lawrence. As
Shakespeare says, "He jests at scars that never felt a wound."
In the realm of personal relations, the legal contribution of the elite
has been the apotheosis of sexual choices. John Noonan has written so
powerfully of the class origins of the movement for legalized abortion
4
that I hesitate to add anything. But I think it is worth noting that
abortion became a feminist agenda item only with the general accept-
ance of women into equal status within the dominant class. Before
that, the main constituencies were doctors who wished to practice
their profession without legal restraints and men who resisted the
social and financial consequences of begetting children. The woman
was most often perceived as a victim-Noonan shows that this was the
original feminist perception. The victim-the dependent woman who
is driven to abortion by economic or social pressures or by the irre-
sponsibility of the father of her child-has not gone away. But the law
is more interested in the independent woman who can handle the
bearing and rearing of a child if she chooses, but has chosen not to.
She is the one who is a member of the elite.
I suspect that other moves in the direction of legal validation of
sexual choices-turning fornication, adultery, and sodomy from
crimes into officially recognized alternative lifestyles-can also be
attributed to the changed position of women within the elite. If you
4. J. Noonan, A Private Choice (New York, Free Press: 1979), pp. 47-68.
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read Betty Friedan's classic The Feminine Mystique,5 you will see that
she envisages a man who is so wrapped up in his technical or manage-
rial role that he cannot sustain a serious and enduring sexual relation
unless the woman takes all the responsibility for keeping it going. Ms.
Friedan's remedy of choice for this situation is (or was when she wrote
the book) for women to embrace technical and managerial roles with
the same mindless exuberance that characterizes their menfolk. For
this remedy to be implemented, something had to give. What gave
was sexual responsibility and commitment. What did not give was the
orientation of the elite toward technical and organizational achieve-
ment at the expense of personal relations. What else did not give was
the class orientation of the law.
Recent reforms in our divorce laws give further support to the
inteiest of the elite in non-responsible sex. No-fault divorce has be-
come in practice divorce on demand for either party. It operates,
therefore, in favor of the spouse with the least psychic investment in
the marriage. This is apt to be the one who has a congenial job outside
the home. The abolition of alimony obviously favors the self-reliant
and employable spouse over the clinging vine type. Putting the whole
package together, we find that it works fairly equitably when both
spouses have independent positions within the elite, but that when one
does and the other does not it is devastating for the one who does not.
One more example: the legal treatment of couples who cohabit
without being married. It is hard to disagree with the view that such
people have obligations toward one another that the law should recog-
nize. But there are significant issues concerning what form that recog-
nition should take. The famous Marvin case,6 putting the relationship
on a contractual basis, overruled a very interesting decision of one of
the California Courts of Appeals treating the relationship as a de facto
marriage-that is, dealing with it as a status.7 The difference between
the contract model and the status model is that the status model allows
the court to protect whichever party needs protection, whereas the
contract model protects the party with the strongest bargaining posi-
tion. I need not tell you what class that party usually belongs to.
Many of our favorite initiatives toward law reform in recent years
have reflected their class origin by presupposing that practice among
5. B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York, 1963).
6. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
7. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). See
also Quebec Civil Code Revision Office, Draft Civil Code 1977, Bk. 2, art. 49, 266,
338; Bk. 3, art. 42 for another proposed treatment of the relationship as a de facto
marriage.
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enlightened members of the elite ought to be the norm for the whole
society. That would seem, for instance, to be the thought behind Karl
Llewellyn's reliance on current commercial standards in his drafting
of the Sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 Or take the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.9 Its two basic reforms were to re-
quire lenders to state clearly how much interest they were charging,
and to change the usury laws so they could charge much more than
before. The idea was that with higher interest rates there would be
more money available for buying things, and that with borrowers
fully informed the rates would not go any higher than economic
conditions warranted. For the class of people who were good enough
credit risks so that they could shop around for favorable rates, and
who could afford to make the payments on what they bought, the
Code seems to have worked out about the way it was supposed to. But
it left low income families more exposed than ever to operators who
sold them shoddy merchandise that they could not afford and charged
them previously unheard of interest rates.
The impact of elite agendas on law reform is particularly felt in the
realm of judicial and administrative procedure. What we understand
by due process of law is that decision makers will have a modicum of
expertise, that prescribed organizational routines will be followed in
the making of decisions, and that those concerned in the process may
bring to bear on it our sophisticated modern technologies for the
gathering and presenting of information. Each of these requirements
contributes to the control of the decision making process by the orga-
nizational and technical class-those who have the expertise, control
the organizations, and know how to assemble and present the infor-
mation. Emphasis on due process has characterized the period of
dominance by this class in much the same way that emphasis on
property and contract characterized the period of dominance by the
bourgeoisie.
There is of course nothing wrong with emphasis on due process. But
because the elite are sophisticated and have plenty of professional
advice, they are apt to implement their procedural concerns without
enough regard for whether their expedients confuse the rest of the
population or put too much strain on the available professional re-
sources. They have developed a criminal procedure that keeps public
8. R. Danzig, "A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code," 27 StanJord L. Rev. (1975), p. 621.
9. For examples of the literature on this subject, see Jordan & Warren, "The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code," 68 Colum. L. Rev. (1968), p. 38; Kripke, "Ges-
ture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform," 44 N.Y. U. L.Rev. (1969), p. 1.
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defenders too busy to handle their caseloads. They have developed a
civil procedure which the Chief Justice of the United States thinks no
lawyer but a specialist can handle. They have developed an adminis-
trative procedure that makes agencies often unresponsive to the people
they deal with, sometimes unresponsive to common sense.
Lawyers apply to themselves a maxim, old in Cicero's time, sum-
mum jus, summa injuria-extreme law is extreme wrong. It is poign-
antly applicable to the procedures emerging from our pursuit of due
process under the guidance of our organizational and technical elite.
They are intended to secure justice, and theoretically they do. But
they create in practice a machinery of power that is accessible only to
people who are familiar with it and know how to manipulate it-or to
those who can afford to hire such people.
Perhaps the most pervasive class bias in our legal system is the one
in favor of protecting the elite against being accountable to anyone
outside their own class. We have a broad range of legal dispositions
shielding professionals of every kind against lay accountability, and
shielding organizations, both public and private, against lateral ac-
countability-that is, accountability that does not run straight up the
organization chart.
The professionals' first line of defense against lay accountability is
peer review-the principle that only a member of the same profession
is competent to judge how well a professional does his job. This
principle is embodied in the certification and licensing laws that
govern entry into some professions and full status in most others. It is
also embodied in a miscellany of other legal arrangements such as the
requirement of professional testimony in malpractice cases or the
standards of review in academic promotion and tenure cases. Peer
review tends to displace lay accountability because there is only so
much accountability possible in a given situation. Also, peer review
tends to produce a uniform outlook among professionals, so that
laypeople are hard put to find alternative standards against which to
measure professional performance.
As long as the goals of the profession are the same as those of the
wider community, peer review serves us well enough. But if we are
concerned with where the whole profession is going, or whether it is
giving too little, charging too much, restricting access unduly, or
claiming prerogatives it does not deserve, we heed some basis for
imposing accountability beyond its own ranks. Our arrangements for
trying malpractice suits, reviewing bills, evaluating alternative
schools, and tenuring cross-disciplinary scholars all suffer from the
lack of any such basis.
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The imposition of peer review is not the only way the law resists lay
accountability. There are a number of cases in which it is assumed
that for laypeople to second-guess professionals is bizarre, unconstitu-
tional, or both. This assumption is reflected in the attitude of the
courts toward administrative expertise and judicial discretion. It is
reflected in the considerable legal support for the view that newspaper
reporters and psychologists must be free to apply their own standards
of confidentiality without outside interference. The current contro-
versies over selection of books for libraries present another example of
the same assumption at work. When the decision to get rid of a book
or not to acquire it is challenged in court, you can be sure it was the
decision of a school board or a city council, and not that of a profes-
sional librarian.
Barriers to lateral accountability are growing rapidly in both corpo-
ration law and administrative law. Statutory restrictions on what
corporate management may do become more and more attenuated
with each revision of the Model Business Corporation Act. At the same
time, the major financial jurisdictions have put substantial roadblocks
in the way of shareholders' derivative actions. The cases imposing
liability for securities act violations may be an exception to the trend,
but they tend to weigh more heavily on eccentric financiers and
outside directors than on management.
There are also rules that shield important management decisions
from the collective bargaining process. The latest word from the
Supreme Court is that management need not even bargain with its
employees over the closing of the plant in which they work.' 0 There
have been a few statutes requiring employers to give advance notice
before closing down," but these have been vigorously and usually
successfully resisted as placing an intolerable burden on business.
Administrative law in recent years has also taken great strides in the
direction of non-accountability. Constitutional limits on delegation of
power to administrative agencies have virtually dropped out of the
picture. Judicial limits on the kinds of evidence an agency may rely on
are not far behind. Court review of agencies is still often vigorous, but
it has been assigned a definite place in the organization chart, and
only rarely does it stray.
Even in church law, the trend toward non-accountability is at
work. A series of decisions culminating in the Hull Memorial case in
1969 12 has left it that no church member may seek redress in court on
10. First Nat. Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
11. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 109.07; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 26, § 625-B.
12. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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the ground that the leaders of his church have departed from its
official doctrines. The rationale of many of these cases is hard to argue
with. But, whether rightly or wrongly, they add bishops, presbyteries,
and synods to corporate managements and administrative agencies in
the array of pyramidal organizations impenetrable from without.
All these class orientations, and particularly the institutions of non-
accountability, are powerfully supported by the current tendency to
erect ideological neutrality into a legal principle. The tendency grows
out of a fusion of principles favoring racial and religious neutrality
with principles protecting ideological dissidents against persecution. It
is reflected not only in prevailing interpretations of free speech and
the like, but also in widely accepted understandings of such matters as
the attorney-client relation and the social responsibilities of corporate
management. The idea is that a non-empirical value judgment of any
kind is inherently subjective, and cannot legitimately be imposed on
anyone against his will. To impose such a judgment on a choice of
library books violates freedom of the press. To impose it on sexual
choices violates the right to privacy. For an attorney to impose such a
judgment on his client is unethical. For a stockholder to impose it on
management violates management prerogatives.
This attitude supports the elite class because it makes it impossible
for anyone to criticise the way that class is running the country.
Without an ideology, no layman can challenge an expert, and no
outsider can challenge an organization. Empirical observation can
show us that something is going wrong. But without an ideology we
have no way to get around the assurance that the problem is complex,
that the experts who are trying to solve it are the ones best equipped
for the task, and that the organizational routines through which their
expertise is being brought to bear are the right ones. Empirical obser-
vation can show us what we are accomplishing through application of
technical and organizational skills. But without an ideology we can-
not determine whether the accomplishment is good or bad, or
whether, if good, it is worth the resources expended on it.
The philosophy behind the move toward ideological neutrality in
the law has its roots in nineteenth century utilitarianism. Its role in
the nineteenth century was to liquidate the inherited restrictions that
held back the technical and organizational achievements of capitalist
society. It serves much the same purpose today. It is the capstone of an
intellectual edifice by which the whole society is subjected to the
agendas of the dominant class.
In presenting this description of the dominant class in our society
and the legal institutions that support its dominance, I have used the
third person-"it," "they," and "them"-throughout. In fact, though,
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like it or not, I belong to it as do the academic and professional people
with whom I am inextricably identified. We all have or are busy
acquiring the technical and organizational skills that constitute our
tickets of admission. We intend to use those skills, and it would be
irresponsible for us not to. We lead or expect to lead lives of solid
technical and organizational achievement, reaping appropriate mate-
rial and psychic rewards. In any event, we are made very comfortable
by the same economic and social system that makes other people
miserable.
We are not only members of a dominant class, we are members of
an oppressor class. Whatever our personal intentions, our prosperity is
founded on a system that oppresses other people. We are the custodi-
ans and beneficiaries of economic, political, and legal institutions of
which our fellow citizens are the victims. They are paying for our
comfort. We are supported at their expense.
It follows that the liberation of the poor in our society is for us
neither an academic exercise nor an exercise in disinterested benevo-
lence. It is our own liberation from our status as oppressors.
The foundation of this liberation to my mind is the recognition that
we need it. We constantly exemplify the liberationist doctrine that to
ignore the class struggle is to side with the oppressor. By supposing
that we live in a classless society, we are led to suppose that whatever
serves people like us serves everyone in our society. The illusion of
classlessness, as I have said, leads us to mistake class interests for the
common good. To recover a true perception of the common good, we
must learn to recognize a class interest when we see one. I hope that
what I am saying here will help us to do so.
But recognizing class interests will not make them go away. We are
members of an elite class because we have technical and organiza-
tional skills that other people lack. The apparatus that we are running
for the rest of society is more elaborate than the rest of society needs,
but if we dismantle it entirely the rest of society will starve. And
unless we dismantle it entirely we will have to go on running it, and
therefore will have to go on having interests different from other
people's. We can and should reduce the scale of elitism in our soci-
ety-say, by limiting the size of corporations and decentralizing the
functions of government-but we cannot expect in the foreseeable
future to get out from under our roles as members of a dominant class.
What we can expect is to mitigate the oppressive character of those
roles. Here, I will have to shift personal pronouns once again. As
lawyers and legal scholars, we are not only members of the dominant
class, we are also the people primarily responsible for seeing justice
done to all classes. To discharge that responsibility, we-that is, we of
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the legal profession-must devise ways of channeling the technical
and organizational skills of the elite into the service of the common
good.
To do this, we must first recover our understanding of what the
common good is. To my mind, this is not as tall an order as we often
suppose. I do not believe we lack a national consensus as to what is a
decent, honest, and humane way to live. The trouble is that we have
been led to believe that it is somehow un-American to introduce that
consensus into our public life. We have been led to believe that respect
for the dissident in our society requires us to keep insisting that there is
no mainstream. But without a national mainstream consensus there
can be no accepted understanding of the common good. And without
an accepted understanding of the common good there can be no
liberation of our people from the dominance of an unaccountable and
self-serving elite. It is important to protect dissenters, but I believe we
can do so without pretending that there is nothing to dissent from.
In other words, if we know as a people where we stand morally and
ideologically, we can use the knowledge to restrain the power of the
technical and organizational elite, and make the exercise of that
power accountable to the wider community. It would be repetitious
to sketch out a practical program for doing so. We can have the
nucleus of such a program simply by reforming the situations I have
already pointed out.
One last point. Some necessary reforms may reduce efficiency,
productivity, per capita income, or other statistical counters devised
by the elite to measure how well they are doing things without deter-
mining whether the things are worth doing. I think we must preserve
a firm equanimity in the face of this possibility. We do not need all the
technical and organizational achievements that these counters mea-
sure. What we need is a decent and contributing life for all our
people. To say that we will fulfill this need only to the extent that it
keeps our technologies and organizations intact is to have our priori-
ties backward.
This inversion of priorities seems to be characteristic of a ruling
class mindset in every period. It is natural for the ruling class to
suppose that its prerogatives are based on moral imperatives, and that
inconceivable disasters will ensue if its manner of organizing society is
tampered with. The sufferings of other classes, if they cannot be
relieved within the existing framework, must be tolerated as the inevi-
table side effects of a basically beneficent system. This is how the
ancient Greeks and Romans (to say nothing of John C. Calhoun) felt
about a system based on slavery, how the feudal aristocracy felt about
a system based on skimming the top off the proceeds of subsistence
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agriculture, and how capitalists felt about a system based on property,
contract, and the Iron Law of Wages-maybe some of them still do.
It is not surprising that the people who run our technologies and our
organizations should feel the same way about the system that is now in
place.
Certainly none of us who belong to the elite is free from this class
based outlook. But our religion, our profession, and our education all
urge us to look beyond class interests. If we do, we should be able to
see that the real moral imperative is to provide the minimum condi-
tions for decency and usefulness for everyone in our society, and the
real disaster would be failing to do this when we have the necessary
resources. With that perception, we can make our legal system what
our predecessors intended it to be-an instrument for doing justice to
all classes; an instrument of freedom to oppressed and oppressor alike.
